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Executive Summary 
The long lasting drought and very high temperatures this spring created 
unfavourable conditions for crops in Ukraine, and 2007 grain crop is expected to be lower 
than last year. The Government of Ukraine (GOU) has already reacted by publishing a 
resolution No. 794 as of 4th of June "On immediate measures for mitigation of drought 
effects and forming grain supply for 2007". This resolution, among other measures, 
calls for the introduction of grain export quotas. On the 20th of June the GOU adopts another 
Resolution No. 844 “On amendments of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
resolution No.1852 as of 25th of December 2006” introducing export quotas for wheat, 
barley, corn and rye from July 2007 until October 2007. For each of these products the 
export quota will be 3,000 t starting July 1 until there is enough grain in the State Reserves. 
The amount is very small and the resolution is actually a grain export ban. A grain 
export licensing system and grain export quotas were already introduced in 
October 2006. They have been abolished for corn and barley in spring 2007 and for wheat 
only recently on June 8, 2007. Thus, with the introduction of new quotas expected early  
July 2007, export restrictions will remain in the new season.  
The main concern of the GOU is to keep domestic grain prices under control during the 
period of public purchases for the state grain reserves. By doing this, the GOU aims to 
ensure food security and price stability for bread.  
The grain and bread price developments receive significant public attention in 
Ukraine, and the export restrictions are supported by many Ukrainians. This is why 
the GOU wants to achieve basically two objectives: 
1. Food security, i.e. controlling the amount of grain exported out of the country. 
2. Price stability, i.e. keeping domestic grain prices low, which otherwise would 
reflect the world market developments.  
In fact, with the planned grain export restrictions the GOU can achieve these goals. 
However, the economic costs of this policy are very high, and we argue that there are 
better options available to achieve the goal of food security in Ukraine.  
1. It is often believed that without grain export restrictions too much grain would 
be exported out of Ukraine leaving nothing for the domestic market. However, 
as in most other countries, price mechanisms will ensure that the exports are 
restricted. If the domestic supply is endangered, prices will rise domestically and exports 
out of Ukraine will no longer be competitive and feasible. However, the problem is that 
Ukrainian official statistics are notoriously unreliable, politically motivated and often not 
publicly available in time. This is why the market participants cannot assess the situation 
properly and in a timely manner, and this is also why the Ukrainian market is sometimes 
overreacting.  
2. The Ukrainian market does not have a supply problem but a price for the poor 
problem. On average Ukrainians spend a considerable share of their disposable income 
on food with the poor spending most of their income on food. The Ukrainian government 
should help the poor by using targeted cash transfers. Grain export restrictions keep 
certain food prices low for both the poor and the rich.  
3. Export quotas effectively decrease farm-gate prices as well as farm profits. 
Since farm employees’ income depend on farms’ profits, export quotas indirectly 
decrease the income of the population employed in the farm sector as well, where 
salaries are practically the lowest in the economy. Therefore, the resulting loss in 
income of the farm sector employees would cancel out the benefit coming in the form of 
lower bread prices.  
4. The measures taken by the Ukrainian Government in 2006 were not consistent 
with the WTO policies. This does not mean that the Ukrainian government is not 
allowed to impose grain export quotas. The WTO provides clear application and 
implementation rules. It provides so-called safeguard clauses and the exporting country, 
which faces a food shortage, can apply export restrictions. Measures can be introduced 
only after evaluation by the WTO. Existing contracts of market participants need to be 
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respected. Thus, an introduction of grain export quotas was not the major problem for 
grain traders in 2006, but the manner in which they were introduced. 
5. The grain export restrictions decrease farm profits and investment growth in 
Ukraine. This year farmers will not only suffer from drought but as a consequence of 
the export ban also from much lower prices. It is most likely that farmers will react 
accordingly in the fall of 2007 and will reduce the acreage planted with wheat – a 
market that has been heavily influenced by the politics. They may switch to other crops 
like rapeseed, where exports are still unrestricted..  
Thus, the Ukrainian government misses the chance to get a bigger crop next year and 
prevents Ukrainian producers to realise agricultural potential that Ukraine is said to have. 
After a meagre 0.5 % growth rate of the Agricultural GDP in 2006, the 2007 growth rate will 
be very small also, lagging far behind the overall growth rate of the Ukrainian economy.  
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Are the Grain Export Restrictions an Appropriate Measure to Achieve Food 
Security in Ukraine? 
 
The long lasting drought and high temperatures this spring resulting in 
unfavourable conditions for crops in Ukraine. Most affected is the barley crop followed 
by wheat. Currently, there is a number of grain harvest estimates available with substantial 
differences. Until the crop is harvested the exact damage is therefore difficult to assess. 
However, the Ukrainian government has already reacted by publishing resolution No. 794 as 
of 4th of June "On immediate measures for mitigation of drought effects and 
forming the grain supply for 2007". This resolution, among other measures, calls for the 
introduction of grain export quotas. On the 20th of June the GOU adopts another Resolution 
No. 844 “On amendments of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution No.1852 
as of 25th of December 2006”  introducing export quotas for wheat, barley, corn and rye 
starting July 2007. For each of these products the export quota will be 3,000 t starting July 
1 until there is enough grain in State Reserves. For comparison, wheat exports are expected 
to be 2.3 mln. t. in 2006/07 marketing year compared to 6.4 mln t in 2005/06. Barley 
exports are expected even higher at 5.3 (4.2) mln t. The draft resolution was already 
published in early June as the government is required to publish the law 30 days prior to 
application of the quota. A grain export licensing system and grain export quotas 
were already introduced in October, 2006. They have been abolished for corn and 
barley in the spring of 2007 and only recently for wheat on June 8, 2007. Thus, with 
the introduction of new quotas early July, 2007, export restrictions will be practically 
extended into the new season.  
With these measures, the Government of Ukraine wants to achieve basically two 
objectives: 
1. Food security, i.e. controlling the amount of grain exported out of the country. 
2. Price stability, i.e. keeping domestic grain prices low, which otherwise would reflect 
the world market developments.  
 
In Ukraine, grain export restrictions receive a wide public acceptance. Part of this is 
related to the Ukrainian history. The Ukrainian Holodomor in 1932-1933, often referred to 
as the Ukrainian Genocide, was a famine caused by the policies of the government of the 
Soviet Union under Stalin. The direct loss of human life was huge, with estimates varying 
between 5 and 16 mln. Less than ten years later the German occupation triggered another 
hunger. This happened in a country that is well known as the breadbasket of Europe. 
Furthermore, trust in market mechanisms did not completely develop and government 
intervention into the economy is often preferred.  
On average, food accounts for approximately 45 % of the total expenditures of the 
Ukrainian population.. Thus, any food price increases considerably affect the real income 
of the population and also impact inflation, as the food share in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) of Ukraine is comparatively high.  
The Ukrainian government is correct in its assessment that the export quota has 
achieved both, food security and price stability. Starting October, 2006 Ukrainian 
grain prices were significantly lower than they would have been with a free export regime 
since October 2006. While it is safe to assume that the domestic Ukrainian grain price was 
20 to 40 US$/t lower than it would have been without the export quotas on grain, the 
precise effect is difficult to measure. 
However, the economic costs (welfare losses) of the introduction of grain export 
quotas are huge. Farmers and trading companies accrue significant losses, reputation of 
Ukraine as a reliable and transparent country for investments and trade suffers, leading to 
more losses in the future. Farmers generate less income, investing less in new technologies 
and switching to less “policy-sensitive” crops. The result is that growth of Agricultural GDP 
remains far behind GDP growth of the economy in general. Loss of income and investment 
this year leads to reduced growth in the following years.  
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These raise the question whether Are export restrictions are unavoidable and 
whether there are better alternatives to achieve food security in Ukraine. The 
following arguments in favour of the Grain export restrictions are scrutinised and 
alternatives presented below: 
1. Would grain deficit prevail without quotas? In the 2006/07 marketing year 
Ukraine would not have suffered a grain deficit without the introduction of 
grain export quotas: Although the government is constantly claiming that exporters 
would have shipped too much grain out of the country without the introduction of the 
grain export quota, this is not true. A transparent price mechanism is regulating grain 
exports. If grain exports create a shortage at the domestic market, the prices go up 
preventing further exports. Thus, markets work, and Ukraine does not have a grain 
availability problem, but a grain price for the poor problem. 
2. Are the grain statistics reliable? Reliable, independent and publicly available 
grain supply and demand statistics would facilitate operation of market 
mechanisms. Currently there is a shortage of good market data. Although many 
projects were initiated by international organisations, Ukraine does not have a good 
market information system. Production, supply and demand statistics still entail 
politically motivated figures. It is especially difficult to obtain data on domestic grain 
use, grain stocks, etc. This, however, is what grain traders rely on. Currently only 
private information is available. A good market information system, similar to the USDA 
system, would provide the necessary information to avoid food shortages. It would also 
increase market transparency and predictability of grain markets.  
3. Are public and private stocks available? With the lack of reliable statistics, the 
grain availability in private stocks is rather difficult to assess. There are three 
major market information agencies operating in Ukraine, which all provide slightly 
different data on the grain crops, the domestic demand, the expected exports and 
therefore the ending stocks. Thus, it is a difficult task to count tons available and it is 
hard to give a preference to a specific source. It is also uncertain whether the Ukrainian 
government is able to do this, as it has no means to measure the crop, internal demand 
and stocks properly.  
4. Should grain import taxes be reduced? Grain imports are not a national 
catastrophe. Policy makers and some Ukrainian media argue that the country should 
not export too much wheat that would create an import demand later. However, this 
situation is quite common in many countries. Germany, for example, exports and 
imports wheat simultaneously. In Ukraine it would probably make sense to import some 
wheat into western Ukraine from Poland or Hungary and simultaneously export grain 
from southern regions. However, Ukraine imposed prohibitively high import duties and 
the recently published plans to abolish them would be an important step to mitigate 
price increases on the domestic market once imports are necessary.  
5. Can food security for the poor be achieved through export restrictions? Ukraine 
does not have a grain availability problem but a price for the poor problem and 
the Government of Ukraine should not focus solely on food availability, but on 
food security. Food security of a person or a country depends on many factors.  
Income is the most important one. 
In Ukraine poor include pensioners, single mothers, and unemployed, just to name a 
few, which would not afford to pay for higher bread prices. These people need direct 
support from the government, for example targeted cash-income transfers or probably 
food stamps. This would reduce the negative impact of price increases on these groups 
and at the same time allow farmers benefiting from high world market prices.   
The grain export quota does not target the poor only. It provides the same subsidy 
to the poor and the rich. The grain export quota does not cover food grains only. It also 
provides a large implicit subsidy to the livestock producers. Meat and dairy products, for 
example, are the type of food that is mainly consumed by high-income consumers. 
Thus, the implicit subsidies initiated by the grain export quotas favour the rich 
much more than the poor.  
Farmers pay the quota bill. Export quotas effectively decrease farm-gate prices, 
and farm profits accordingly. Since farm employees’ income depend on farms’ 
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profits, export quotas indirectly decrease the income of the population 
employed in the farm sector as well, where salaries are among the lowest in 
the economy. Therefore, the resulting loss in income of the farm sector employees  
cancels out the benefit coming from the lower bread prices. 
6. Are grain quotas consistent with the objective to join WTO? The measures 
taken by the Ukrainian Government in 2006 were not consistent with the WTO 
policies. The introduction of grain export quotas in 2006 were criticized due to their 
sudden introduction and the effect that they had on the existing contracts. This triggered 
significant losses for grain traders, as ships were waiting in ports, existing contracts 
were not be fulfilled, grain prices dropped and grain rotten in storages.   
 This does not imply that the Ukrainian government is not allowed to impose grain 
export quotas. The WTO provides a set of quota introduction and application rules. It 
provides so-called safeguard clauses and the exporting country, which faces a food 
shortage can apply export restrictions. Once a food shortage situation is evaluated by 
the WTO, measures can be taken. However, existing contracts need to be respected. 
Introduction of grain export quotas was not the major problem for grain traders. 
Instead, the manner in which they were introduced was more problematic.  
7. Will bureaucracy and corruption increase? The administration of any export or 
import quota is complicated. A good example is the grain import quotas of the EU. All 
details need to be regulated to make the management of the quotas transparent, 
practicable, reliable and non-discriminatory. To achieve this goal, a group of companies 
or individuals eligible to apply for quotas must be defined.  The bidding process, timing, 
the allocation of quotas and other details have to be regulated. It took approximately  
half a year for the EU to design its third country import quota for wheat and barley 
before it was finally introduced on January 1, 2003. In 2006 the government of Ukraine, 
which has little or no experience in quota administration, established the quota within a 
few weeks. This accelerated introduction of the quota created many problems, 
particularly for the trading companies. The application procedure was quite unclear, 
numerous documents were required, some had little or nothing to do with the quota 
administration. Companies that received quotas later were not able to use them and 
exporting was impossible even with the quotas allocated! Therefore, the quotas are 
not reliable. The criteria on which the allocation process is based is neither practicable 
(i.e. they create large transaction costs), nor they are transparent. Criteria for quota 
allocation are not clear. As the allocation process is non-transparent, whether 
quota allocation is non-discriminatory is difficult to assess. However,  the unclear 
allocation procedure points to the fact that they are most likely discriminatory. Finally, 
quotas  create opportunities for corruption.  
8. How will farmers react? The grain export quota damages productivity and 
production: The Ukrainian government prevents farmers benefiting from high world 
market prices. This reduces income and investment. High grain prices could foster 
investments in the sector, allowing Ukraine to produce 50 or even 60 mln t of grain, 
which is much more than today. Thus, the GOU prevents farmers to fully use agricultural 
potential.  These policies contradict government plans to substantially increase 
production by 2015. Farmers will most likely increase the oilseed acreage and 
decrease the grain acreage in the 2007 fall planting campaign. During 2006/07 
and 2007/08 seasons farmers realized that the grain market is highly political.  Due to 
this political uncertainty they are forced to sell their crop well below world market prices. 
There are alternatives, i.e. rapeseed, soy beans and sunflower. Winter rapeseed 
survived the drought much better than winter and spring grains and prices for 
both crops are very attractive. Therefore, farmers could increase the rapeseed 
acreage substantially and reduce the grain acreage. Similar behaviour of the 
farmers is observed in other parts of the world. In Canada, for example, the Canadian 
Wheat Board (CWB) acts as a wheat export monopolist. The problem is that farmers are 
not getting paid by the CWB immediately after they deliver the crop, but sometimes 
months later. Rapeseed and barley exports are not restricted by a monopoly. Thus, 
farmers can sell the crop whenever they like and immediately receive the entire 
payment. This is considered to be one of the main reasons why Canadian farmers have 
decreased their wheat acreage to 9.7 mln ha down from last year's 10.7 mln ha and 
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have increased their barley and rapeseed acreage. Another example is Argentina, 
where the government  imposed high export tariffs for wheat and in some 
cases completely restricted wheat exports. Thus, most farmers are expected to 
switch to barley, rapeseed and soybeans this year, probably creating even 
greater problems next year.  
9. How large is the impact on inflation? Grain prices have an impact on inflation, 
but this cannot justify export restrictions. The share of food in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) of Ukraine is quite high. However, food prices have tended to keep the 
consumer price inflation lower rather than increasing it in 2006. Flour and bread 
represent 0.5% and 3.9%of the consumer price basket, respectively. Thus, higher bread 
prices are not a major contributor to the cost of living. Even if the recent rise in 
international grain prices had been fully passed forward to domestic consumers, this 
would have led only to a moderate increase in the CPI. Thus, even if the inflation is 
somewhat depressed by the grain export quotas, the effect is small and the cost is high.  
Many parties involved respect and understand the position of the Ukrainian government to 
impose measures that ensure food security, especially for the poor. Nevertheless, the 
measures taken by the Ukrainian government are not in line with the objective to reach 
higher growth rates in the agricultural sector. There are better policy options available to 
help the poor.  
Thus, it is very important for the Ukrainian government to develop a strategy that helps the 
Ukrainian people to cope with high grain prices. A social transfer policy targeting the poor 
(targeted cash income transfers) would avoid trade restrictions and would also be consistent 
with the WTO membership. The greatest benefit is that it would allow farmers to 
freely sell their products. It would also reduce the politically induced uncertainty 
and would therefore help to fully use Ukraine's large agricultural potential. 
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